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ABSTRACT
Eldridge, Tami Marie, M.A., 9/11/92

Clinical Psychology

Normative Study of the Portland Digit Recognition Test:
An Assessment of the Effects of Motivation on Neuropsychological
Evaluations (103 pp.)
Director:

Herman A. Walters, Ph.D.

This study provided normative data for the Portland Digit
Recognition Test (PDRT), a forced-choice recognition memory test
designed to aid in the detection of malingering in patients undergoing
neuropsychological evaluations. The effects of age, gender and
neuromedical risk on PDRT performance were examined. The extent to
which performance varied as a function of the length of the interpolated
delay interval also was evaluated. Likert-type items assessing
motivation and estimation of enhanced performance for compensation were
administered following the PDRT. Significant decrements in performance
with longer delay intervals were hypothesized. It was predicted that
the results would be negatively skewed, with all subjects obtaining
scores appreciably above the chance level.
The normative sample consisted of 120 college students and local
volunteers who passed a preliminary neuromedical screening. Results
were negatively skewed with all subjects scoring appreciably above the
chance level. Males scored significantly higher than females on Trial
Block 1 (5 sec. delay). Medical risk factors associated with
educational difficulties and the Total Risk score were found to covary
significantly with Trial Block 1 scores. There was a significant
decrement in performance between the 5 sec. and 15 sec. trial blocks, as
hypothesized; however, there was a significant increment in performance
between the 15 sec. and 30 sec. trial blocks. A significant increment
in performance also was observed between the first and second 30 sec.
trial blocks. Differential endorsements on the Motivation item were
associated with significant variation in PDRT scores.
An excluded sample of 89 subjects who did not pass the preliminary
screening were given the same assessments as the normative sample.
Results for the excluded sample were similar to those for the normative
sample, with the exception of there being no main effects for sex and
significant main effects for the Compensation item. Scores for the
excluded sample were not significantly different from those for the
normative sample. Implications of the present study are discussed in
light of previous research by Binder and Willis (1991).
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Introduction
Important decisions with the potential to change the
courses of individuals' lives are routinely made on the
basis of psychological assessment data.

Young children are

determined to possess intellectual handicaps such as
learning disabilities or mental retardation, potential
employees are screened for their efficacy in a given
occupational role and criminals are assessed for their
competency to stand trial.

Because of the critical nature

of the decisions which rest on these assessments, the
psychometric soundness of the measurement instruments
utilized is crucial, thus well researched.

However, even a

well constructed assessment device may be vulnerable to
produce erroneous data if the individual who is being
assessed responds in a way which is inconsistent with his or
her actual behavior or ability level.

The motivations of

the subjects of psychological evaluations are undoubtedly as
complex and diverse as the goals of the assessments.

While

many situations are structured such that an individual has
intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivation to respond sincerely
or to perform at an optimal level, there are other instances
in which one could be motivated to respond deceptively.
Motives may vary widely in their origin and intensity, from
avoiding prosecution by feigning incompetence, securing
compensation by exaggerating or simulating an injury, to
meeting dependency needs by pretending to be mentally ill.
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Deception, which is also referred to as malingering or
dissimulation in the literature is defined in the DSM-III-R
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) as the "intentional
production of false or grossly exaggerated symptoms,
motivated by external incentives..." (p. 360).

Resnick

(1988) reports that estimates of the incidence of malingered
psychological symptoms after an injury range from one 1% to
over 50%.
While malingering traditionally has been viewed as a
dichotomous variable, Rogers (1988) suggests that it should
be viewed in terms of gradations existing along a continuum.
A related issue, concerning the degree to which
dissimulation is under conscious control, cannot be
addressed clinically due to the absence of "behavioral or
clinical concomitants from which to assess conscious
intention" (Cunnien, 1988).

The inability to ascertain

individuals' level of conscious motivation seriously
compromises clinicians' ability to discriminate between
intentional malingering and conversion disorders, in which,
following an injury, individuals exhibit persistent pain and
loss of function which is unexplainable in terms of organic
pathology.

Even in relatively more clear-cut cases of

malingering, clinicians are hesitant to make a diagnosis of
malingering due to the ethical and legal ramifications of
"false positive" errors.

3

Clinicians vs. Lawyers; Fortifying vs. Discrediting the
Validity of Psychological Assessment Data
Due to the current lack of objective indices of
malingering, a heated controversy has arisen in the
dissimulation literature between researchers representative
of two major factions of professionals, clinical
psychologists and lawyers.

Researchers supporting the

efficacy of psychological assessment techniques and
testimony are attempting to establish valid and reliable
indicators for the detection of malingering (e.g., Rawling &
Brooks, 1990).

Lawyers, who in the course of defending or

prosecuting litigants often are highly motivated to
discredit the testimony of clinical neuropsychologists, are
attempting to establish empirically that clinicians cannot
distinguish between malingerers and nonmalingerers at a rate
much better than chance (e.g., Faust, 1988; Ziskin, 1988).
The confirmational biases associated with these opposing
hypotheses makes the current literature in this area
difficult to evaluate and interpret.
The paradigm employed by David Faust, the most prolific
researcher in the lawyer faction, involves having clinicians
blindly (i.e., without having conducted the assessment)
evaluate protocols, some or all of which are bogus, to
determine whether a diagnosis of neuropsychological
impairment is appropriate.

In a controversial study (Faust,

Hart & Guilmette, 1988) children were instructed to "fake
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bad" on a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment with
minimal coaching as to how to proceed.

Because 93% of the

clinicians who reviewed the cases diagnosed abnormality, the
researchers concluded that individuals can fake believable
deficits on neuropsychological assessments.

In a two-part

follow-up, Faust, Hart, Guilmette & Arkes (1988) purportedly
fortified this claim by instructing three teenagers to "fake
bad" on neuropsychological testing.

In the first study, the

test results and a fabricated history of mild to moderate
head injury were sent to a representative sample of clinical
neuropsychologists, 75% of whom judged the test results to
be abnormal and attributed the results to cortical
dysfunction.

None detected malingering.

In the second

study, the effects of forewarning on the case appraisal were
examined by sending equal numbers of actual and feigned
results to a new sample of neuropsychologists who were
informed of a 50% base rate for malingering.

Despite

confidence in their evaluations, clinicians did not surpass
the level of chance in their detection of malingering.
Faust et al. again concluded that convincing deficits can be
faked on neuropsychological assessments and further that
"clinicians' overconfidence in their ability to detect
simulation may partly explain why so little research has
been devoted to this topic (p. 508)."
In a response to these claims, Bigler (1990) attacked
the external validity of the Faust et al. research on the
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basis of a number of methodological issues, including the
limitations of the questionnaire format utilized in the
study, the inexperience of the neuropsychological judges
employed and the questionable nature of the process used to
select them.
Faust and Guilmette's (1990) response to Bigler's
criticism is well summarized by their article's title "To
Say It's Not So Doesn't Prove That It Isn't: Research on the
Detection of Malingering. Reply to Bigler."

A fervent

response to Faust and Guilmette's assertion by the clinical
neuropsychological community in the form of research is
currently underway (P. Bach, personal communication, August
1991).
The "simulation malingering paradox" has been used to
identify measures which discriminate the response patterns
of faking subjects from normal controls and/or patients with
brain damage.

These studies involve administering a number

of standardized tests and tests specifically designed to
detect malingering, after which multivariate statistics
generally are applied to identify discriminant functions
which reliably discriminate between groups.

In addition,

test profiles are scrutinized for internal inconsistency of
deficit patterns (Benton, 1961; Boone & Filskov, 1990;
Goebel, 1983; Heaton, Smith, Lehman & Vogt, 1978; Kerr,
Gramling, Arora, Beck, Morin, Cole & Irby, 1990; Pankrantz,
1988; Rawling and Brooks, 1990; Suffield, Davidson, Nantau,
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Orenczuk & Mandel, 1990).

While group differences between

subjects feigning malingering and nonmalingerers repeatedly
have been established utilizing this paradigm, the clinical
utility of such procedures for identifying malingering in
individual patients is limited due to the absence of crossvalidation data on specific indices and cut-off scores
(Boone & Filskov, 1990).

In addition, even if measures

could be devised and cross-validated on the basis of interand intrasubtest inconsistency within an extensive battery
of assessments, the components of which may not be relevant
to a particular patient, there may be legal, ethical and
practical constraints to employing such laborious methods in
the detection of malingering.
There would be obvious advantages to a simply
administered screening device which could signal the
possible existence of malingering at the outset of a
neuropsychological evaluation, so that subsequent behavioral
observations and techniques could be employed to
substantiate or dispute its existence.

Several such

techniques have been devised and tested (Pankratz, 1988).
Most of these techniques are designed such that they appear
more difficult than they actually are, thus the malingering
subject routinely performs considerably below expected
levels, unwittingly revealing his dissimulation.

Possibly

the most effective techniques identified to date for the
detection of malingering are forced-choice techniques in
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which the subject has a 50/50 chance of responding correctly
to each item; thus, over a number of trials, response rates
significantly below the level of chance suggest the
deliberate production of wrong answers (Binder & Willis,
1991; Pankratz, 1983).

Often, individuals instructed to

"fake bad," subjectively experience the 50% hit rate as "too
successful" and consequently produce scores which are
appreciably below chance (Binder & Pankratz, 1987).

Hiscock

and Hiscock (1989) recently refined one such technique, the
Portland Digit Recognition Test - a forced choice digit
recognition task.

The task as described by Binder and

Willis (1991) involves the auditory presentation of 5-digit
strings, followed by a 5 or 15 sec. delay ("Easy items"), or
a 30 sec. delay ("Hard items"), during which the subject
performs a distractor task (counting backward from 20, 50 or
100), after which a visual probe card with the target item
and a distractor is presented.

Prior to the presentation of

the "Hard items" subjects are told that the task will become
more difficult due to the lengthening of interpolated delay
interval.

Binder and Willis (1991) subsequently

demonstrated that it was possible to differentiate subjects
with different motivational levels on the basis of their
performance on this simply administered test of recent
memory.

Patients receiving financial compensation as a

result of minor head trauma performed significantly more
poorly on the Portland Digit Recognition Test than patients
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with well-documented brain dysfunction or affective
disorders who were not applying for compensation.

These

findings are compelling in that this is the first research
to demonstrate significant group differences in an actual
patient population utilizing one simply administered
assessment device.
Rationale and Design
It seems that the next step in facilitating the use of
the Portland Digit Recognition Test in clinical settings
would be to establish a baseline against which an individual
patient's performance may be compared.

Consequently, the

purpose of the present study was to establish the normal
performance of subjects not at risk for neurological
impairment on the Portland Digit Recognition Test, so that
deviations from this expected pattern could be delineated
more effectively in clinical settings.

While a non-patient

group was included in the Binder and Willis (1991) study,
the sample size was extremely small (n=13).

The present

study utilized a much larger sample size (n=120) to increase
the probability that significant normal trends would be
uncovered and to decrease the probability that results would
be affected unduly by chance fluctuation.

Also, Binder and

Willis (1991) reported significant age differences across
subject groups which was not controlled because no
significant relationship between age and performance was
found.

It could be argued that the diversity of the
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subjects included in the Binder and Willis (1991) sample
could be responsible for the absence of age-related
differences in performance.

The more homogeneous sample

utilized in the present study was stratified for age to
increase the likelihood of uncovering age differences,
should they exist.

Similarly, while Binder and Willis

(1991) found that males and females in their sample had
almost identical means, the present sample was stratified
according to gender, so that the effect of this variable in
a larger, less heterogeneous sample could be assessed.
Also, the present study included additional parameters for
analysis.

Medical risk indices were quantified (See

"Method" section) and included in the data analysis.

In

addition, decay curves for the various time delays were
graphed for comparison across the subject groups.
In addition to enhancing the usefulness of this
instrument in clinical settings, the present study was
intended to contribute to laying the groundwork for future
investigation aimed at elucidating the dynamics of this
definitionally maligned phenomenon - malingering.

It

sometimes seems that after a behavioral phenomenon which is
perceived as negative is labeled as such and targeted for
identification solely for the purpose of eradication, the
perspective through which it is viewed is narrowed to the
extent that complex dynamics may be obscured if not ignored.
It is hoped that by providing a gauge against which the
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performance of individuals suspected of malingering can be
compared, systematic discrepancies may be uncovered and
further research into the intricacies of this ill-understood
phenomenon may be designed and implemented.
The global construct of malingering considered in the
context of a psychological evaluation has significant
potential theoretical importance.

As greater definitional

clarity regarding the underlying dynamics of this phenomenon
is achieved, subtypes of the behavior and factors in the
environment and individuals which predispose its occurrence
may be identified, providing the dual benefit of aiding
clinicians in assessing and treating their clients and
enhancing scientific understanding of the complexities of
human motivation.
Relevant Memory Research
Hintzman (1990) described two major trends which have
been evident in recent memory research, efforts toward the
development of formal theoretical models (labeled
"connectionist"), and an experimental paradigm involving the
comparison of different memory tasks (labeled
"dissociationist").

Connectionist or "neural network"

theories have received considerable attention recently to
the extent that they have been declared a "paradigm shift"
for psychology.

Hintzman describes the "dissociation"

method of experimentation as "enormously influential."

It

is viewed as an outgrowth of the "proliferation of tasks"
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designed to measure memory, which resulted inevitably in the
comparison of different tasks as a means of clarifying the
mechanisms involved in different forms of memory and memory
involving various stimuli.

While a discussion of the

subtleties of connectionism and dissociationism is beyond
the scope of the present paper, the interested reader is
referred to Hintzman (1990) for a thorough review.
There are several dual-process theories of recognition
which have persisted for some time (e.g., Atkinson & Juola,
1973; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Johnston et al., 1985; Mandler,
1980).

Mandler (1980) reviewed the evidence for these

theoretical positions and substantial support for the models
was provided.

The basic premise of these models is that a

"rapid, direct access familiarity response (based on trace
strength, perceptual integration, or perceptual fluency,
depending on the model) is separate from a slower recall or
search process based on associative or elaborative
processing." (Johnson & Hasher, 1987; p. 643).

Gillund &

Shiffrin (1984) have proposed that these models may have
over-emphasized the search factor.

They suggest that the

familiarity responses underlying recognition are affected
both by the associations between items and between items and
context, essentially that the activation level of the item
is determined by the simultaneous activation of episodic
traces, which is conceptually similar to Hintzman's (1986)
position that recognition relies on "echo intensity"
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(Johnson & Hasher, 1987).
Issues of importance in recognition research have
included investigating: age differences in recognition
performance; gender differences; practice effects; modality
match between stimulus and probe conditions; similarity
between old and new test items (probes and distractors); and
repetition effects.

Pertinent results will be reviewed

briefly for the purpose of buttressing the hypotheses which
follow and providing the rationale for implementing some of
the control measures described in the methods section.
While progressive decrements in overall memory with
advancing age tend to be the general rule, closer
examination of age effects on different types of memory
tasks reveals that the pattern is considerably more complex.
Bowles and Poon (1982) examined age differences in
recognition memory utilizing a standard two-alternative
forced-choice paradigm and found no significant difference
in accuracy between the younger adults (mean age = 22) and
older adults (mean age = 72); however, the distribution of
scores for the older group differed in that it was bimodal
with the upper mode not differing from that of the younger
group, but the lower mode representing a significant
decrement in performance.

Utilizing the Rey Auditory Verbal

Learning Test, Bleecker, Bolla-Wilson, Agnew and Myers
(1988) found that while age and sex accounted for a
significant portion of the variance on a recall task, the
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recognition trial was not affected by age or sex.

Craik and

McDowd (1987) found greater age losses in recall than
recognition, suggesting that it fits with the general scheme
that older people perform less well on any difficult task;
however, the researchers preferred to substitute the concept
of "difficulty," which may be subject to various
interpretations with that of tasks requiring "more selfinitiated activity or more processing resources."

Results

from Light and Anderson (1985) appear to support this
hypothesis in that age-related decline in recognition of
prose (which could be seen as involving higher level
processing) was found.

Scrutiny of age-related performance

on tasks presumably requiring relatively less complex
processing on the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (e.g.,
Digit Span; Figural Memory) reveals consistent, slight
decrements across age groups of apparently non-significant
proportions (i.e., when contiguous groups are compared).
Unfortunately, no study examining age differences in a
forced-choice memory task employing a Brown-Peterson
paradigm could be found other than Binder and Willis (1991)
which found no correlation between age and level of
performance.

The diversity inherent in the subjects

utilized in this study makes it unclear whether this is a
reliable finding.

It is possible that performance of a

distractor task during the delay interval could increase the
processing complexity of the PDRT to the extent that age
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differences may become evident given a sufficiently large
sample size with relatively uniform characteristics.
With the exception of certain instances of facial
recognition (e.g., McKelvie, 1984) gender differences in
recognition memory repeatedly have been found to be
negligible.
Postman (1982) found no evidence of practice effects
with feedback and experience on either a yes-no or forcedchoice recognition test, which the author attributed to "the
difficulty of identifying and implementing test-appropriate
strategies" (p. 333).

Elliott, Geiselman & Thomas (1981)

used a four-alternative recognition test within a modified
Brown-Peterson paradigm and found that performance decreased
more quickly with increased length of the distraction
interval when the test modality (auditory or visual) did not
match the modality of presentation than when the modalities
did match.

Other evidence suggests that there is better

recall for recency items presented in the auditory modality
than for items presented in the visual modality (Horton &
Mills, 1984).
Tulving (1981) describes a robust rule regarding
similarity in recognition memory, that is, "recognition
accuracy is inversely related to the similarity between the
old and new test items" (p. 479) with the exception of a
relatively more complex situation involving memory for
photographs.

Similarity between old and new items has been
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referred to as "a very powerful variable" (Kintsch, 1970)
and as "the most important of stimulus variables affecting
perception and recognition alike" (Podgorny & Shepard,
1978).
Repetition effects have been found to be significant in
enhancing performance on memory tasks.

Recognition has been

found to be increased monotonically as a function of the
number of item presentations (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork,
1988).
Research Objectives and Hypotheses
While the primary purpose of the present study was to
provide normative data for the Portland Digit Recognition
Test, another purpose was to investigate whether there were
significant differences in performance on the test between
subject groups as a function of age, sex and medical risk
status.
Several hypotheses were put forth on the basis of the
research just reviewed.

It was predicted that all subjects

would perform at or above the chance level, with the
preponderance of subjects performing at a level considerably
above the chance level and no subjects performing
significantly below chance.

Similarly, it was predicted

that the frequency distribution of subjects' recognition
scores would be negatively skewed.

It was expected that

performance levels in the present study would be slightly
below that of normal subjects in Binder and Willis' (1991)
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study due to the fact that a lower mean level of education
was likely in the present sample.
It was predicted that there would be significant
differences between overall subject performances on Easy vs.
Hard items, with a significant decrement in overall
performance exhibited between the short (5 and 15 sec.) vs.
longer (30 sec.) distractor interval due to the interpolated
task interfering with rehearsal (Brown, 1958; Peterson and
Peterson, 1959).
Method
Subjects
An age and sex stratified sample of 120 subjects
passing the preliminary neuromedical screening (described
below) was obtained, including 30 subjects (15 male, 15
female) in each of the following age groups: 18-20; 21-25;
26-3 0; 31-45.

The total number of subjects tested in the

process of obtaining the 120 screened subjects was 243.
Subjects who unambiguously did not pass the screening
constituted the "excluded" sample (n=89).

Please consult

Table 1 for a breakdown of excluded subjects by age and sex.
The remaining 34 subjects were not included in either the
normative or excluded sample: 20 subjects provided
insufficient information on the screening for a
determination of whether or not they passed the screening to
be made; 8 subjects were eliminated due to missing data; and
6 subjects were eliminated because they passed a lightened
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version of the screening (described later in this section),
but were not needed for the normative sample as the subject
quotas in the various cells had been fulfilled.
During the initial stages of data collection, subjects
were exclusively Introductory Psychology students at the
University of Montana who participated to obtain
experimental credit which is required for their successful
completion of the course.

Later in the data collection

period, alternate methods of subject recruitment were
employed due to a large number of subjects not passing the
neuromedical screening and due to there being insufficient
numbers of older students enrolled in the Introductory
Psychology course.

A number of subjects were recruited

through other University courses.

Some of these subjects

participated on a voluntary basis, while others were offered
extra credit by their professors.

Subjects were also

recruited through sign-up sheets posted at various locations
on the campus.

These subjects were paid $5.00 for their

participation.

Finally, several subjects were recruited on

a voluntary basis from the local smokejumper base.
Subjects were screened for neuromedical risk factors
utilizing a two-part screening questionnaire developed by A.
Tindall (1990).

The Preliminary Screening (See Appendix A)

included questions regarding the subjects' neurological,
psychiatric and drug history.

Subjects were excluded from

the normative sample on the basis of Tindall's (1990)
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criteria (See Appendix A); however, data from unambiguously
excluded subjects were subjected to post-hoc analysis with
the hope that significant trends in the data in accordance
with neurological status might be uncovered.

Due to

difficulty obtaining subjects in sufficient numbers later in
the data collection period, the exclusion criteria were
lightened to include subjects in the normative sample who
reported having had a neuropsychological test, but had not
been evaluated by a neurologist or a neurosurgeon and had
not been diagnosed with a neurological condition.
The second portion of the neuromedical screening, the
Medical Risk Screening (See Appendix B) included questions
regarding risk factors in the following seven categories:
early development, education, mild head injury, toxicity,
anoxia, illness risk, and family history.

Rather than

excluding subjects from the normative sample on the basis of
a certain threshold level of medical risk factors, Tindall's
(1990) procedure for quantifying the indices and including
them as a variable for analysis was employed.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the testing site, the subject was
invited into the assessment room during which time the
examiner attempted to establish rapport.

Subjects were told

that they were free to withdraw from participation at any
time and were informed of the measures that would be taken
to safeguard the confidentiality of the information they
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provided.

Subjects initially completed the neuromedical

screening questionnaires described previously.

Subjects

were administered the Portland Digit Recognition Test by one
of several trained examiners.

Prior to this time the

examiners became proficient in the administration and
scoring of the PDRT to maximize standardization and control.
After the subject and examiner were seated at opposite sides
of the assessment table, the task was introduced as a test
of memory.

The examiner encouraged the subject to do his or

her best and then introduced and implemented the assessment
in accordance with standardized instructions (See Appendix
C).

The examiner recorded subject responses on a PDRT test

protocol (See Appendix D).
Due to the research described previously relating to
repetition effects, it was emphasized in training the
examiners that subject attention should be gained prior to
presenting items, because repetition of items was not
allowed under any circumstance as it would render the
results invalid.

Following administration of the PDRT,

subjects were given two Likert-type items (See Appendix E).
The first item was intended to provide the subject's
retrospective estimation of their level of motivation while
taking the test.

The second item asked subjects to estimate

the extent to which they felt they could have performed
better if they had received financial compensation to do so.
At the conclusion of the assessment period, subjects were
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given an opportunity to ask any remaining questions they
might have and they were told how they could learn the
results following completion of the project.

Credit sheets

for participation were completed for subjects immediately
following the assessment period.

Subject names did not

appear on the assessment data; rather, all data pertaining
to a given subject were assigned a code number in order to
safeguard confidentiality.
Independent Measures
Sex, age group membership, Motivation item endorsement,
Compensation item endorsement, and the eight medical risk
scores described previously were the independent variables
used in this study.

In addition, for the purpose of

comparative analyses between the normative and excluded
group, status with regard to the neuromedical screening
constituted an independent measure.

Those passing the

screening were considered "normative" subjects while those
who unambiguously did not pass were the "excluded" subjects.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures obtained from the PDRT included the
total raw score (number correct) and the raw score for each
of the four 18-item trial blocks.

Trial Block 1 was

comprised of the 5 sec. delay items; Trial Block 2 was
comprised of the 15 sec. delay items, Trial Blocks 3 and 4
were the 30 sec. delay items.

The subscores were also

computed at two levels, rendering two additional dependent
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measures which are comparable to the subscores utilized in
Binder and Willis' (1991) research.

The 18 five sec. and 18

fifteen sec. delay trial blocks were combined to constitute
3 6 "Easy" items; and the two 18-item, 30 sec. trial blocks
constituted the 36 "Hard" items.
Results
Normative Sample
Means, standard deviations and ranges for the dependent
variables for the normative group and the excluded group are
presented in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2 lists descriptive

statistics for PDRT subscores for Trial Blocks 1 through 4.
Descriptive statistics for total scores and for "Easy" and
"Hard" subscores which correspond to Binder & Willis' (1991)
research are presented in Table 3.

Means itemized by age,

gender and age x gender are presented in Tables 4 through 6,
respectively.

Statistics for Binder and Willis' (1991)

normative group are included in Table 3 to facilitate
comparisons with the present study.

Means for Easy, Hard

and total scores for the current normative sample were
consistent with those obtained for Binder & Willis' small
nonpatient control group (n=13) with discrepancies of less
than one half point.
An initial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed
to determine whether there were significant differences
between subjects who were admitted to the normative sample
utilizing less stringent screening procedures (adopted later
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in the data collection period) and those who were admitted
with the regular criteria.

These results were

nonsignif icant.
A test for homogeneity of the regressions was conducted
to determine whether there were significant interactions
between either or both of the between subjects factors
(i.e., age and/or gender) and the medical risk scores.

None

of these analyses produced significant results (See Table 7
for a summary of results), suggesting that the covariates
could be entered in subsequent analyses without introducing
interpretation problems.
A covariate analysis of variance (CANOVA) was conducted
to determine whether there were significant differences in
PDRT total scores as a function of sex and/or age group
membership without the influence of effects due to medical
risk status (See Table 8 for summary of F-ratios).

There

were no significant interactions or main effects as a
function of sex and/or age group membership.

None of the

covariates were significantly related to PDRT total scores.
Two additional CANOVA's were conducted utilizing each of
the subgrouping schemes for the PDRT scores (See Tables 8
and 9 for a summary of F-ratios).

An analysis of Easy and

Hard scores as a function of sex and age group membership
with medical risk scores entered as covariates yielded main
effects for sex which were marginally significant on the
Easy items F(1,119)= 3.88, p=.051 with males producing

23

higher scores than females (See Table 5 for means).

With

regard to the covariates, the "education" medical risk score
which is comprised of questions related to educational
difficulties (i.e., learning problems, special education
services, etc.) was significantly related to the score for
Easy items, F(1,119)=4.69, p<.05.

The "early history"

medical risk score which is comprised of questions related
to prenatal, perinatal and early childhood medical problems
was also related to the score for Easy items at a level
approaching significance, F(l,119)=3.83, p=.053.

No

significant sex, age or sex x age effects or covariate
effects were obtained for the Hard items.

A second CANOVA

was utilized to examine scores for Trial Blocks 1 through 4
as a function of sex and age group membership.

Significant

main effects for sex were obtained for Trial Block 1,
F(1,119)=9.35, JDC.OI, again with the mean score for males
being higher than that for females.

The "education" medical

risk score was significantly related to scores on Trial
Block 1, F(1,119)=8.59, pc.Ol.

There were no significant

covariate effects, main effects or interactions for scores
on Trial Blocks 2 through 4.
Analyses were conducted to investigate whether the
total medical risk score (i.e., the composite score of all
medical risk indices) was related to the PDRT total score or
any of the subscores.
significant results.

Only one of these analyses produced
The total risk score accounted for a
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significant amount of the variance for Trial Block 1,
£(1,119)=4.31, £><. 05.
Several analyses were conducted to determine the nature
of effects associated with the increasing length of the
interpolated delay interval (See Table 10 for a summary of
results).

An initial examination of means revealed a

potential contradiction between the present findings and
those from Binder & Willis' (1991) small norm sample.

While

in Binder and Willis' study, there is a slight decrement in
performance between the Easy vs. Hard items, the opposite
trend is observed in the present study (See Figure 1 for a
graph of this trend).

However, a within-subjects

multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed that the
observed increment in performance between the Easy vs. Hard
items was not significant.

A more fine-grained analysis

was conducted utilizing another MANOVA examining the within
subjects factor of delay at three levels, across Trial
Blocks 1 through 3.

A significant effect for difficulty was

obtained, F(2,238)=40.84, p<.001.

This effect was examined

more closely utilizing an examination of the means for the
three trial blocks and successive MANOVA's to make
comparisons between each trial block and the following trial
block.

This revealed a significant decrement in performance

between Trial Block 1 and Trial Block 2 consistent with the
hypothesis that poorer performance will result with an
increased interpolated delay period, F(l,119)=49.90, pc.001.
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However, a significant increment in performance was observed
between Trial Block 2 and Trial Block 3, which contradicts
the aforementioned hypothesis, F(l,119)=5.60, p<.05.

An

additional MANOVA revealed that there was a significant
increment in performance between Trial Blocks 3 and 4 as
well, F(l,119)=10.44, p<.01.

See Figure 2 for a graph of

mean scores as a function of delay across Trial Blocks 1
through 4.
Several analyses were employed to assess whether the
Motivation and Compensation items administered following the
PDRT were significantly related to the PDRT total score.
The first item, which was intended to provide a selfreported retrospective estimation of motivation, asked
subjects to rate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree) the extent to which they felt they had
performed to the best of their ability on the task.

A

MANOVA with special contrasts between adjacent means was
utilized to determine if there were significant differences
in total PDRT scores in accordance with this measure of
self-reported motivation and, if so, what the direction and
extent of these differences were.

There were significant

differences in total PDRT scores as a function of
motivation, F(4,115)=4.14, pc.01.

A closer examination of

the effects utilizing the special contrasts between adjacent
means revealed an interesting pattern of results.

Because

there was only one subject who responded "2," legitimate
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statistical comparisons could not be made with this
endorsement level.

However, examination of the means for

endorsements of "1" and "2" revealed that these subjects
scored higher than individuals endorsing "3," which is
contrary to the pattern that would be expected on an
intuitive basis (i.e., increasing levels of performance with
increasing levels of self-reported motivation).

A t-test

confirmed that the mean score for individuals endorsing "1"
was significantly higher than that for individuals endorsing
"3" (t=2.39, df=8, £><.05).

Comparison of means for

motivational levels 3, 4 and 5, revealed results which were
consistent with what might be expected.

Individuals

responding "3" performed significantly more poorly than
those responding "4" (t=-2.62, df=4, p<.01) and individuals
responding "4" performed more poorly than individuals
responding "5" at a level approaching significance (t=-1.96,
df=4, £=.05).

Scrutiny of the means across motivational

categories revealed that the means for individuals
responding "3" appeared consistently and significantly lower
than means for all of the other motivational levels.
Another MANOVA specifying contrasts between each
motivational level and the mean across levels revealed that
individuals responding "3" did in fact score significantly
lower than the mean across levels, while this was not the
case for any of the other motivational levels (t=-3.37,
df=4, p<.001).
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The Compensation item was intended to assess the extent
to which subjects felt they would have performed better if
they had received financial compensation to do so.

The

numbering convention was the same as for the previous item,
with an endorsement of "1" meaning "strongly disagree" and
"5" meaning "strongly agree."

An ANOVA was conducted to

determine the extent to which differential endorsements were
related to differences in PDRT total scores.
were not significant.

The results

See Table 11 for sample means

associated with the various endorsements for the Motivation
and Compensation items.
Excluded Sample
Data from the 89 subjects eliminated from consideration
for the normative analysis due to neuromedical risk were
analyzed for heuristic purposes with methods similar to
those described for the normative sample.

Descriptive

statistics for this sample are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Means itemized by age, gender and age x gender are presented
in Tables 4 through 6, respectively.

Dependent measures

were itemized utilizing the same scheme as for the normative
sample.

Means for Easy, Hard and total scores were

consistent both with the normative sample included in the
present study and with the small normative sample described
by Binder & Willis (1991) (See Table 3).
Scrutiny of the means for the various scores for
excluded vs. normal subjects in the present study revealed
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that excluded subjects' mean scores were slightly but
consistently lower than those for the normative sample by a
margin of less than one half point.

Several ANOVA's were

conducted to determine whether PDRT total scores or any of
the subscores for excluded subjects differed significantly
from those for subjects in the normative sample.
these tests produced significant results.

None of

Individuals

eliminated from the normative sample due to neuromedical
risk did not produce total scores or subscores which were
significantly different than those produced by subjects
included in the normative sample.
As with the normative sample, a test for homogeneity of
the regressions was conducted to determine whether there
were significant interactions between either or both of the
between subjects factors (i.e., age and/or gender) and the
medical risk scores.

Several of these analyses were

significant, suggesting that a CANOVA like that performed on
the data from the normative sample would be uninterpretable
(See Table 12).

Thus, straightforward analyses of variance

(ANOVA's) were employed to investigate whether there were
significant differences in any of the dependent measures as
a function of sex and/or age group membership.

None of

these analyses produced significant results (See Table 13).
Analyses were employed to assess whether increasing
length of the interpolated delay period was associated with
a decrement in scores (See Table 14 for a summary of
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results).

An initial examination of means revealed a slight

increment in performance between the Easy vs. Hard items as
was observed in the normative sample.

However, as with the

normative sample, a within-subjects multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) revealed that the observed increment was
not significant (See Figure 3 for a graph of this trend).
Another MANOVA was utilized to examine the within subjects
factor of delay at three levels (5 sec., 15 sec. and 3 0
sec.) across Trial Blocks 1 through 3.

A significant effect

for delay was obtained, F(2,176)=10.18, pc.001.

This effect

was examined more closely utilizing successive MANOVA's to
make comparisons between contiguous trial blocks.

As with

the normative sample, there was a significant decrement
between Trial Blocks 1 and 2 consistent with the hypothesis
of poorer performance with increased length of the
interpolated delay period, F(l,88)=20.23, p<.001.

A MANOVA

was utilized to investigate whether there was a significant
difference between scores on Trial Blocks 2 and 3.

In

contrast with the normative sample findings, these scores
were not significantly different.

However, consistent with

the results for the normative sample, there was a
significant increment in scores between the third and fourth
trial block, F(1,88)=14.02, p<.001.

Please see Figure 4 for

a graph of mean scores as function of delay across Trial
blocks 1 through 4.
The results of the Motivation item intended to measure
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self-reported motivation to perform well on the task were
examined in relation to PDRT total scores.

A MANOVA

including special contrasts between adjacent means was
utilized to determine if there were significant differences
in total PDRT scores in accordance with the various
endorsements on the Motivation item and, if so, what the
nature of these differences were.

This analysis revealed

that there were significant differences in total PDRT scores
as a function of endorsed level of self-reported motivation
toward the task, F(4,99.55)=3.19, p<.05.

A closer

examination of the effects by way of the special contrasts
between means revealed that only one of the contiguous mean
pairs was significantly different.

As with the normative

sample, the mean total scores for individuals responding "4"
were significantly lower than the mean for individuals
responding "5" (t=-2.94, df=4, pc.Ol).

Scrutiny of the

means revealed that the individuals endorsing "3" scored
lower than the other four groups, as was the case with the
normative sample.

However, a comparison of the mean of the

group endorsing "3" with the overall mean across groups
produced nonsignificant results.
An analysis of the Compensation item was conducted to
determine whether there was a relationship between the item
endorsement and PDRT total scores.

Unlike the results of

this analysis for the normative sample, the MANOVA utilized
to investigate this relationship for excluded subjects

produced significant results, F(4,83)=5.22, pc.Ol.

Closer

examination of the relationship between mean total scores
for contiguous endorsements revealed that means associated
with each of the adjacent endorsements were significantly
different with one exception.

Means for subjects endorsing

"2" and "3" did not significantly differ.

The mean total

score for an endorsement of "1" was significantly higher
than that for an endorsement of "2" (t=2.25, df=4, jo<.05).
The mean total score for individuals endorsing "3" was
significantly higher than that for individuals endorsing "4"
(t=2.60, df=4, p<.05).

The mean total score for subjects

endorsing "4" was significantly lower than that for subjects
endorsing "5" (t=-3.42, df=4, pc.001).

An additional

comparison was conducted to determine the extent to which
the means for the various endorsement levels deviated from
the overall mean across levels.

Means for subjects who

endorsed "1" and "4" were significantly different from the
overall mean, with means associated with endorsements of "1"
being significantly higher than the overall mean (t=3.16,
df=4, pc.Ol) and the mean associated with an endorsement of
"4" being significantly lower (t=-3.61, df=4, pc.001).

The

mean associated with an endorsement of "5" was higher than
the overall mean at a level approaching significance
(t=1.95, df=4, £=.05).

Consult Table 15 for sample means

associated with the various endorsements for the Motivation
and Compensation items.
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Discussion
Introduction
This study provided normative data for the Portland
Digit Recognition Test.

Additionally, it investigated

whether there were significant differences in test scores as
a function of age, sex and medical risk status.

The extent

to which the length of the interpolated delay period
significantly impacted scores also was examined.

Several

hypotheses were put forth on the basis of existing research.
These will be reviewed along with supporting or
disconfirming evidence from the present study.

A discussion

of the results for the normative sample will be presented
first, followed by a discussion of the results for the
excluded sample.

Finally, the results will be integrated

and discussed in light of Binder and Willis' (1991) research
and suggestions for future research will be provided.
Normative Sample
It was predicted that the frequency distribution of the
recognition scores would be negatively skewed with all
subjects producing scores at or above the chance level.

It

was predicted that the preponderance of subjects would
produce scores considerably above chance and no subjects
would produce scores significantly below chance.
these hypotheses were supported.

All of

The lowest score was 49

total correct out of a possible 72, which is considerably
above the chance level.

The results clearly were skewed in
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a negative direction.

The median score was 66 total

correct, and the mode was 64.
It was predicted that there would be significant
differences between scores on Easy vs. Hard items, with a
significant decrement in performance exhibited between the
Easy items and the Hard items (Brown, 1958; Peterson and
Peterson, 1959).

This hypothesis was not supported with

regard to the Easy vs. Hard items; rather, there was a
nonsignificant increment between the Easy and Hard item
scores.

Consistent with the hypothesis of poorer

performance with increasing delay, there was a significant
decrement in performance between Trial Blocks 1 and 2.
However, there was a significant increment in performance
between Trial Blocks 2 and 3, which is exactly counter to
the hypothesis.

Further, there was a significant increment

in performance between Trial Blocks 3 and 4.
These results could be explained on the basis of
practice effects; that is, subjects may exhibit increased
skill at executing the task with repeated trials.

It is

possible that early in the test, the increase in length of
the interpolated delay period from 5 sec. to 15 sec. was an
important factor in terms of increasing the difficulty of
the task.

However, as the test progressed, subjects might

have been able to compensate for the increased difficulty
through strategies that were acquired with practice.

This

possibility is supported by comments made by subjects while
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engaged in the task.

On several occasions subjects reported

discovering strategies to remember the numbers as the test
progressed (e.g., remembering only the first and last digits
of the strings).

While not all of the strategies subjects

described proved infallible, they had the potential of
increasing their ability to answer correctly over time.

It

also is likely that a number of subjects developed
strategies, but were hesitant to describe them to the
examiner.

Several subjects who described their strategies

talked about them in terms of "beating the test" or figuring
out the "trick" to the test; consequently, some subjects
might have been hesitant to talk about strategies viewed in
this way to the examiner.

The fact that the PDRT consists

of the same 18 five-digit target items repeated over the
four trial blocks also could have contributed to practice
effects.

Subjects' increasing familiarity with the target

items over time could have enhanced their ability to
discriminate them from the distractor items.

In any case,

the fact that performance-enhancing strategies may be
available to examinees certainly does not dilute the
instrument's potential effectiveness in detecting
malingering, rather it provides further justification to
view poor performances with suspicion.
The study also investigated whether scores varied
significantly as a function of age, sex or medical risk
status.

There were no significant differences in scores in
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accordance with age group membership, which is consistent
with the literature in this area.

With regard to gender, an

unexpected main effect was discovered on Trial Block 1.

Men

produced significantly higher scores than women for these
items.

This is a finding which will need to be replicated

by future investigators to ensure that it is not an artifact
of the present research (e.g., the result of sampling error,
etc.).

Existing research does not suggest that men will

produce higher scores on short delay digit recognition
items, nor does it help to elucidate why this might occur.
With regard to the medical risk scores, higher
"education" risk scores were associated with lower scores on
both the Easy items and Trial Block 1. The "education" risk
score included four questions which asked about history of
school retentions, learning problems in several subject
areas, receiving special education services and referral to
the school psychologist.

Higher "early history" risk scores

were associated with lower scores on Trial Block 1 at a
level approaching significance.

The "early history" risk

score included six questions which asked about premature
birth, birth problems, low birth weight, pregnancy
complications, major illnesses before age 6 and febrile
convulsions.

The "total" medical risk score (i.e., the

score comprised of all risk indices) also was related to
scores on Trial Block 1 items.

The fact that the medical

risk scores were associated with a significant amount of
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variation for Trial Block 1 scores only, suggests that these
items may be sensitive to memory deficits associated with
the various risk factors.

It is possible that the medical

risk covariates are significant on these earlier items and
not on subsequent items, due to these earlier items being
those which are most dependent on memory capacity, while
later items may be more dependent on the practice effects
described in the previous section.

In other words, there is

a slight possibility that the first trial block of the PDRT
is a purer measure of actual memory capacity than subsequent
trial blocks.

During later trial blocks practice effects

may become a more salient variable than memory; or at least,
they may represent a confounding variable.

This also may

lend a modicum of support to the main effect for sex which
was uncovered only on the first trial block.

If men and

women have actual differences in memory capacity for this
type of digit recognition task, and if the aforementioned
hypothesis regarding the potentially confounding nature of
practice effects in later trial blocks is correct, these
effects may be more likely to manifest themselves on the
first trial block than on subsequent trial blocks.

It

should be noted that this is a very tentative hypothesis as
no existing research has been found which supports the
obtained effects.
Differential endorsements on the Motivation item which
was intended to measure self-reported motivation to perform
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well on the task were associated with significant
differences in PDRT total scores.

The pattern of effects

does not conform to what might be expected on an intuitive
basis (i.e., increasing total scores associated with
increasing levels of self-reported motivation).

The fact

that subjects endorsing "3" produced total scores at a level
significantly lower than the mean across all other
endorsements, suggests several possible interpretations.
Subjects who respond in a fashion which may reflect
negativity toward the task (e.g., endorsing "l" or "2M as
their level of motivation) might also be expected not to
engage in a very labor intensive introspection with regard
to matching their level of motivation to an endorsement on
the Motivation item, while subjects reporting at least an
intermediate level of motivation or higher, might be
expected to expend some effort in describing their actual
level of motivation.
"5"

Consequently, responses of "3" through

might reflect more accurate estimates of motivation

than responses of "1" and "2."

Another possible

interpretation is that individuals responding at the
extremes (i.e., "1" and "2" or "4" and "5") are more
susceptible to errors in reading the direction of the scale
than individuals who are responding "3," which is in the
middle and unaffected by directional considerations.
Because the distribution was skewed in the direction of
responses of "4" and "5," this source of error might have
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been attenuated at the high end of the scale, while there
were too few responses at the low end of the scale to
provide similar correction.
Differential endorsements on the Compensation item
which asks subjects to estimate the extent to which they
feel they could perform better on the task if they were
compensated to do so were not associated with variation in
mean scores on the PDRT.

However, an examination of the

results of this item in conjunction with those from the
Motivation item revealed an interesting finding with regard
to individuals who endorsed "3" on the Motivation item (who
were also the subjects who produced the lowest PDRT scores).
Almost all of these individuals

responded in the

affirmative when asked if they could perform better at the
task if they were to receive compensation, in that three of
the four individuals responded "4" and the fourth responded
"3" to that item.

This is interesting in light of the fact

that the modal response to this item was "1" with
approximately 56% of the subjects responding "1."
Consequently, those subjects responding "3" to the
Motivation item seem to be saying that they are not
performing to the best of their ability, but they could do
better if they received compensation to do so.
In summary, the results suggest that subjects may be
aware of their level of motivation when responding to the
PDRT.

To the extent that it seems reasonable to expect that
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"awareness" of motivation would be a prerequisite for
intentional "modulation" of one's level of motivation, the
possibility that intentionally produced motivational
deficits could be manifested on the PDRT is supported by the
present results.
Excluded Sample
As with the normative sample, hypotheses regarding the
distribution of scores were supported.

The frequency

distribution of total scores for the excluded sample was
negatively skewed with all subjects scoring appreciably
above the chance level and no subjects scoring below chance.
As with the normative sample, the lowest score was 49 total
correct out of 72 total possible.

The median number correct

was 65 and the mode was 71.
With regard to the hypothesis of poorer scores with
longer interpolated delay intervals, scores for the excluded
sample exactly paralleled those for the normative sample
with one exception.

There was not a significant increment

in scores between Trial Block 2 and Trial Block 3 as was
observed in the normative sample.

This may be due to the

smaller excluded sample size providing a less powerful test,
or it may be attributable to some characteristic of the
excluded sample which differs from the normative sample
(e.g., neuromedical risk).

If a practice effect is

operative in countering the increased difficulty imposed by
the longer delay interval as was hypothesized in the
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previous section, it is possible that for excluded subjects
this practice effect is not sufficiently powerful at that
point in the test (between Trial Blocks 2 and 3) to
compensate for the difficulty imposed by a longer delay
interval.

The possibility that the practice effect later

becomes a sufficiently powerful mode of compensation is
supported by the significant increment in scores observed
between Trial Blocks 3 and 4.
Scores for the excluded sample did not vary
significantly as a function of age group or sex for PDRT
total scores or any of the subscores.

The absence of a sex

main effect on Trial Block 1 for the excluded sample may be
a result of differences in this sample relative to the
normative sample (e.g., due to differential neuromedical
risk status), or it may be due to this sample being of
insufficient size to uncover the effect, if it exists.
However, the absence of this effect in the excluded sample
suggests even more strongly that this finding in the
normative sample should be viewed cautiously and should be
subjected to attempts at replication.
Results for the Motivation item, were very similar to
those for the normative sample in terms of trends; however,
only one of these trends was significant for the excluded
sample.

Individuals endorsing "4" produced significantly

lower scores than individuals endorsing "5."

Means

associated with endorsements of "3" through "5" again
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conformed to what would be expected, with better total
scores associated with higher self-reported motivational
levels.

In contrast, mean scores for endorsements of "1"

through "3" exhibited the opposite pattern, with decreasing
mean scores associated with successively higher levels of
self-reported motivation.

These results are not

inconsistent with either of the interpretations put forth in
the previous section.

Again, it is possible that

endorsements of "1" or "2" on the Motivation item may
reflect these subjects' negativity toward the task, which
could be expressed in their not expending sufficient energy
introspecting about the item to provide an accurate estimate
of motivation.

The pattern of results also conforms to the

alternate interpretation that some individuals endorsing
motivational levels at the extreme ends of the item
unwittingly could have reversed the direction when
responding to the item.
The Compensation item which was intended to measure
subjects' estimation of their ability to enhance their
performance if they received financial compensation to do so
was found to be associated with significant variation in
PDRT total scores, while this was not the case in the
normative sample.

It is difficult to discern a meaningful

pattern when scrutinizing the results across the various
endorsements.

Subjects endorsing "1" and "5" obtained total

scores which were significantly above the overall mean on
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the PDRT, while subjects endorsing "4" scored significantly
below that level.

Similar to the subjects who endorsed "3"

on the Motivation item in the normative sample, the subjects
who endorsed "4" on the Compensation item may be the
subjects in the excluded sample of the most interest to the
present research.

Scrutiny of data for the subjects who

endorsed "4" on the Compensation item revealed that five out
of six of these subjects endorsed "4" or "5" on the
Motivation item.

Thus, these subjects appear to be saying

on the Motivation item that they performed their best on the
PDRT (i.e., endorsement of "5") or almost their best (i.e.,
endorsement of "4"), yet they scored significantly lower
than the overall mean for their peers.

In responding to the

Compensation item, these same subjects are agreeing to a
moderately strong degree that they could score better if
they were paid to do so.
Within these seemingly contradictory responses may lie
an important subgroup of responders; that is, individuals
who say they performed as well as they could when their
scores suggest otherwise, and go on a moment later
essentially to admit they could do better if compensated to
do so.

It is as if when responding to the Motivation item

that they are not attending to the apparent discrepancy
between how they performed and how they might optimally
perform if they applied themselves fully; however, a moment
later they acknowledge that this discrepancy exists when
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responding to the Compensation item.
In responding to the Motivation item, these subjects
are responding in a socially desirable direction, saying
they applied themselves fully when perhaps they really did
not (as evidenced by their low scores).

In their response

to the Compensation item, these subjects seem to abandon
social desirability, both by contradicting their response to
the Motivation item, and by answering in a direction that
would seem to be the least socially desirable (i.e., saying
that they would have done even better if they'd been paid,
essentially admitting that they didn't do their best,
despite admonitions by the examiner to try their best).
This may be further testimony to the salience of financial
gain as a reinforcer of behavior in that subjects may become
less concerned about social desirability when the
possibility of payment is addressed, without even a promise
of actual compensation.
Summary and Conclusions
Overall, the present study supports the findings from
Binder and Willis' (1991) research.

Risk of neurological

impairment as defined by the present study was not a
significant determinant of PDRT scores.

Scores for

neurologically normal subjects did not differ from subjects
at risk for neurological impairment.

These results are

consistent with Binder and Willis' finding that subjects
with well-documented brain dysfunction who were not slated
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to receive compensation obtained scores which were higher
than those obtained by subjects with mild head injury who
stood to receive compensation for their impairment.

To the

extent that the excluded subjects in the present study are
comparable to the subjects with mild head trauma in Binder
and Willis' research, which is a debatable issue, these
results support the contention that the poorer performance
of the mild head trauma patients who stood to receive
financial compensation for their injuries was due to
motivational differences rather than neurological
impairment.
Scores obtained in the present study fell slightly
below those of Binder and Willis' small normative sample,
but appreciably above their next highest scoring group, the
"Brain Damaged-No Compensation" subjects (i.e., individuals
with documented brain damage not in line for compensation)
and well above the binomial probability level which would be
cause for suspicion for malingering.

Figure 5 presents a

graph of scores for the present study along with those for
Binder and Willis' various subject groups.

Lines of

demarcation are drawn at the level of Binder and Willis'
cut-off scores (derived from the lowest scores obtained by
"Brain Damaged-No Compensation" subjects) and at the scores
which represent a binomial probability level which is
significantly below chance (i.e., p<.05).

The authors

suggest that it is not necessary for scores on the PDRT to
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be significantly below chance for the question of
malingering to be raised, rather that scores below the cut
off level should regarded with suspicion.
Binder and Willis did not control for age and gender
because their analyses suggested that there was no
relationship between these variables and PDRT scores.

The

present study predominantly supported this course of action
in that there were no age and gender effects, with the
exception of the mean score for males on the 5 sec. items
being higher than that for females.

Binder and Willis did

not indicate which dependent variables they analyzed as a
function of age and gender.

However, it is reasonable to

assume that because they did not look at the 5 sec. items in
isolation for any of their other analyses, this likely was
also the case for the age and gender analyses.

It is

possible that if they had performed such analyses, they
might have found significant gender effects for the 5 sec.
items; however, given that there is no evidence in previous
research for gender differences on this type of task, it
seems at least as likely that the gender effect found in the
present study is a spurious one which should be subject to
replication before it is regarded with seriousness.
Binder and Willis (1991) did not address directly the
impact of the length of the interpolated delay interval on
performance.

There was a decrement in performance between

the Easy and Hard items across all subject groups in their
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study.

The authors affirmed the existence of this decrement

by reporting in the literature accompanying the PDRT test
materials that "many patients will perform much worse on the
Hard than the Easy items (p. 4)."

This clearly was not the

case for the present sample, in which there was a
nonsignificant increment in performance between the Easy and
Hard items and a significant increment in performance
between Trial Blocks 1 and 2.
There are several potential explanations for the
different patterns observed in the present study as compared
to Binder and Willis' research.

It is possible that Binder

and Willis' control group was too small to reveal this
pattern.

Also, subjects from Binder and Willis' sample with

neurological impairment and/or "motivational differences"
may exhibit a decrement in performance with an increasing
delay interval for different reasons.

The longer delay

interval may present a greater challenge to subjects with
sufficiently severe neurological impairment and/or these
subjects may not exhibit the practice effects which were
hypothesized to be responsible for the increment in
performance exhibited in the present study.

The finding

that subjects in line for compensation did more poorly on
the Hard items is consistent with Binder and Willis'
contention that "motivationally different" subjects become
less effective at the task when they are told with each
successively longer interval that the test is "going to get
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harder."

It seems important to note that the examiner's warning
that the task would get harder in the subsequent trial block
did not appear to have the effect of decreasing performances
of subjects in the present study on Trial Block 3.

It is

not possible to predict from the present data the extent to
which this suggestion might have contributed to the
significant decrement in performance between Trial Blocks 1
and 2.

In any case, the present results may point to an

additional discriminative variable for use in detecting
malingering.

Binder reports in the literature accompanying

the PDRT that "patients who are inclined to fake bad are
more likely to do so as the interpolated activity interval
increases (p. 2)."

In contrast, the normative subjects in

the present study performed better as the task progressed,
rather than worse.

It is possible that motivationally

intact subjects with mild head trauma would exhibit the same
pattern of performance.

If this is found to be true, it

will support the hypothesis that the decrement between Easy
and Hard items observed in Binder and Willis' subjects who
were in line for compensation was due to a motivational
difference rather than neurological insult.

Thus,

observation of this pattern in a mild head trauma patient
could serve as an additional signal for the clinician to
further investigate the possibility of malingering.
Results from the Motivation item support Binder and
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Willis' research in that endorsements on the item were
significantly related to PDRT total scores.

These results

suggest that individuals may be aware of differential levels
of motivation when engaged in the PDRT, which would seem to
be a necessary prerequisite to intentional modulation of
motivation.
Results from the Compensation item viewed in
conjunction with Motivation item scores provide insight into
distinct response patterns that may have some conceptual
significance with regard to the phenomenon of malingering.
While differential endorsements on the Compensation item
were not significantly related to total scores for the
normative sample, there were subgroup of individuals who
admitted not performing their best on the Motivation item,
who also did significantly more poorly than their peers, and
who consistently reported that they believed they could have
done better if they were paid to do so.

For the excluded

sample, Compensation item endorsements were significantly
related to total scores.

In this sample, there was an

interesting subgroup who did more poorly on the task than
their peers and who indicated moderately strong agreement
that they could have done better if paid to do so,
contradicting a previous statement that they had done as
well or almost as well as they could on the task.
Any subject who knowingly did not try to do their best
on the PDRT after the examiner emphasized the importance of
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their doing so prior to the test administration could be
thought of as having engaged in a subtle form of
malingering.

The first subgroup admits to their low level

of motivation on the PDRT and they go on to say that the
discrepancy that they are admitting exists between the
ceiling of their ability level and their present level of
motivation could have been reduced at least to some degree
if the incentive of money had been offered.

The second

subgroup denies a low level of motivation on the first item,
but then acknowledges its existence in responding to the
second item when the incentive of money is mentioned.

This

could be conceptualized in terms of schemata, theoretical
cognitive structures which organize incoming information.
The first group of subjects could be viewed as utilizing the
same schema when answering both the Motivation and
Compensation item (e.g., "I didn't do that well, but I could
have done better if I'd been paid.")

In contrast, it

appears that the second group shifts from one schema to
another when moving from the Motivation item to the
Compensation item.

When responding to the Motivation item,

these individuals might have been responding in a way that
is consistent with a positive self-schema and a positive
social schema
well.").

(e.g., "I was asked to do well and I did

However, the incentive of money described in the

Compensation item might have caused a shift in schemata from
that just described to one which relates to personal gain
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(e.g., "When I am offered money, I will work hard to get
it.").

This theoretical schema shift could account for the

contradiction between these subjects responses on the
Motivation vs. the Compensation item.

They could have very

different ideas about what constitutes their "best" on
boring, compulsory academic hurdles vs. what constitutes
their "best" on any task which will yield personal profit.
Viewed in this way, the responses to the two items may not
be contradictory in the sense that they may be accurate
reflections of two very different cognitive sets.

If this

were the case, it is conceivable that these subjects could
have produced these two seemingly contradictory responses
without suffering pronounced cognitive dissonance, which is
the usual result when an individual engages in behavior
which is discrepant from their prevailing attitudes
(Festinger, 1957).
Limitations of the Present Study and Directions for Future
Research
Due to the difficulty obtaining subjects in sufficient
numbers especially in the older age groups, alternate
methods of subject recruitment were adopted over time, which
introduced an uncontrolled source of variation.

The fact

that these subjects were not all treated in the same way in
terms of incentives to participate also represents a
potential confounding factor.
their participation.

Some subjects were paid for

Receiving financial compensation might

have differentially affected these subjects performance on
various aspects of the assessment.

The payment might have

had the effect of either improving or lowering these
subjects' scores on the PDRT relative to those of subjects
who were not paid.

Also, it is possible that paid subjects

might have construed the Compensation item differently from
subjects who were not paid.

Some might not have perceived

the item with seriousness, due to the fact that they were
already being paid for their participation.

Fortunately,

the number of subjects who either were paid for their
participation, or were solicited outside the campus was
small relative to the number who were recruited from
university courses, lessening this source of uncontrolled
variation.
Also, the time span for data collection was expanded
due to limited subject availability.

This could have

introduced error into the study in that the preponderance of
data for older age groups was collected during a different
season than that for the younger subjects.

It is advisable

that any attempt to replicate this study be conducted at a
site where subjects in all targeted age groups are available
in sufficient numbers so that the data can be collected
within a relatively short span of time with uniform
recruitment procedures utilized during the entire period.
The only demographic variables for which data were
collected in the present study were age and sex.

In
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retrospect, it would have been useful to collect data on
years of education, years of employment, ethnicity and
socioeconomic status (i.e., annual income) so that the
population to which the current results
more fully defined.

generalize would be

It would be advisable for researchers

to collect data on these variables if the present study is
replicated.
Useful directions for future research would include
conducting similar studies with motivationally intact
subjects with various levels and types of neurological
impairment.

When he was told of the plan to initiate the

present research, Dr. Binder suggested that a similar study
of developmentally disabled subjects would be interesting
and of benefit to practitioners.

All of these studies would

serve the function of providing normative data against which
the test results of different types of patients could be
compared.

In addition, discerning patterns of performance

for different types of subjects across the increasing
interpolated delay interval would help to clarify whether
this may be a reliable discriminative factor for use in
detecting malingering.
The hypotheses presented in the previous section with
regard to the Motivation item and Compensation item are
tentative and based upon post-hoc analyses of small subsets
of data; however, it may be this type of qualitative
analysis which will point to possible directions for future
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research in this area with the eventual goal being the
construction of a formal theory regarding the dynamics of
malingering.

As suggested in the introduction, it is often

the case that the dynamics of phenomena which are associated
with negative moral connotations are insufficiently
examined, perhaps because there is a tendency
unintentionally to vilify individuals who engage in the
"bad" or "wrong" behavior and an associated inadvertent
constriction of perspective on the behavior of these
individuals.

When engaging in research which examines the

dynamics of socially undesirable behavior, it may be more
productive to take an optimistic view of human beings which
posits a strong positive self-actualizing tendency (e.g.,
Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1957), which may for various reasons
become thwarted or suppressed.

When our perspective

broadens to that of understanding the complexities of
deviations from what is normal or desirable behavior,
solutions other than finding more effective means of
"identifying the culprits" may become apparent.
It has been apparent for some time that interpreting
human behavior out of context can lead to erroneous
conclusions, which is why systems theories that take into
account multiple determinants of behavior provide promising,
albeit complex, directions for psychological research (e.g.,
Powers, 1973).

It seems that very different conclusions may

be drawn as to why a patient who stands to receive financial
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compensation for a minor head injury may perform less than
optimally on a psychological evaluation if their entire
history and current life circumstances are taken into
account, than if the behavior is interpreted in isolation.
The author has tested a number of head injured patients in a
neuropsychological assessment lab during the past year.

It

has been observed that some minor head injured patients
indicate as much (or more) distress about the changes in
their functioning that they feel have come about as a result
of their injuries, as individuals who have suffered moderate
or severe trauma, who have experienced considerably greater
functional losses.

Young adults with minor head injuries

seem to present with this level of distress most often.
This apparent distress may be due, in part, to presumably
greater self-awareness in younger and less impaired
patients, as some describe noticing and being disturbed by
subtle impairments in functioning since their injury.

It

also may be due to the often challenging nature of the
transitional period of young adulthood.

If these

individuals were slated to receive compensation for their
injuries, these expressions of distress might be explained
in terms of their exaggerating subjective complaints to
increase the probability that they will secure financial
benefits.

This may be true for some individuals; however,

for others, it may be an inaccurate, or at least an
incomplete explanation of what is occurring.

It seems

possible that a patient's perception of the extent of
aftereffects of a minor injury during a demanding period of
life could be exaggerated due to their awareness of the
demands being placed upon them, with which they must
continue to cope (e.g., employment, family needs).

The

likelihood that individuals with minor head injuries possess
more acute self-awareness, relative to patients with more
pronounced injuries, may further exaggerate the extent to
which these individuals feel compromised by their injury.
Also, it seems that any head injury which is sufficiently
serious to warrant evaluation represents an entity to which
an individual could attribute a variety of difficult life
circumstances, some of which even might have preceded the
injury.

Some individuals may credit far greater functional

incapacity to their injury than is warranted and at the same
time may fear that they will not receive the financial
support that they believe they need or deserve due to their
perceived functional losses.

Several patients indicated

that they feared that the tests were not "getting at" (i.e.,
measuring) their impairments.

All of these factors could

contribute to these patients' performing less than optimally
during a psychological evaluation.

Research aimed at

systematically examining the psychological sequelae of minor
head injury, including the extent to which some individuals'
perception of their post-injury functional capacity may
exaggerate their level of impairment, not only during
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psychological assessments, but also in their daily lives,
may be useful.

Examining the effects of age, life stage,

personality characteristics and circumstances of injury on
perception of injury also may be informative.

If functional

deficits that result from head injuries are found to be
augmented by certain individuals' perception of their
injuries, it is possible that interventions could be
developed to increase these individuals' productivity, both
within and outside of the assessment lab.
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Table 1
Breakdown of Excluded Subjects by Aae and Sex

Males

Females

Total

Age Group A
(18-20)

10

6

16

Age Group B
(21-25)

14

2

16

Age Group C
(26-30)

9

6

15

Age Group D
(31-45)

21

21

42

All Acre Groups

54

35

89
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Trial Blocks 1 through 4
Subject
group

Trial Block 1
(5" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 2
(15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
(n=120)

16.67

1.22

13-18

15.51

1.65

11-18

Excluded
Sample
(n=89)

16.49

1.38

13-18

15.52

2.22

8-18

Trial Block 3
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 4
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
(n=120)

15.97

2.15

10-18

16.52

1.74

11-18

Excluded
Sample
(n=89)

15.76

2.15

8-18

16.52

1.87

9-18
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores;
Normative and Excluded Samples
and Binder's (1991) Normative Group

Easy. Hard and Total Scores
Subject
group

Easy
(5"and 15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Hard
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample

32.18

2.28

26-36

32.48

3.44

22-36

Excluded
Sample

32.01

3.08

25-36

32.28

3.56

21-36

32.62

2.57

32.23

4.78

Binder's
(1991)
Normative
Sample
(n=13)
Subject
group

Total Score
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample

64.66

4.84

49-72

Excluded
Sample

64.29

5.86

49-72

64.85

6.59

Binder's
(1991)
Normative
Sample
(n=13)
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group:
Normative and Excluded Sample

Trial Blocks 1 and 2
Subject
group

Trial Block 1
(5" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 2
(15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
Group A
(18-20)
(n=30)

16.57

1.19

13-18

15.17

1.64

11-18

Group B
(21-25)
(n=3 0)

16.53

1.28

14-18

15.40

1.59

12-18

Group C
(26-30)
(n=3 0)

16.47

1.33

13-18

15.80

1.77

11-18

Group D
(31-45)
(n=3 0)

17.10

.99

15-18

15.67

1.60

11-18

Group A
(18-20)
(n=16)

16.31

1.58

13-18

14.88

2.90

8-18

Group B
(21-25)
(n=16)

16.19

1.52

13-18

15.06

2.32

11-18

Group C
(26-30)
(n=15)

16.33

1.11

15-18

14.87

2.17

11-18

Group D
(31-45)
(n=42)

16.74

1.34

13-18

16.17

1.77

12-18

Excluded
Sample

table continues
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Trial Blocks 3 and 4
Subject
group

Trial Block 3
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 4
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
Group A
(18-20)
(n=3 0)

15.73

2.21

10-18

16.23

1.70

11-18

Group B
(21-25)
(n=3 0)

16.00

2.00

11-18

16.47

1.72

12-18

Group C
(26-30)
(n=3 0)

16.17

1.93

11-18

16.47

1.93

11-18

Group D
(31-45)
(n=30)

15.97

2.51

10-18

16.90

1.63

12-18

Group A
(18-20)
(n=16)

15.38

2.19

12-18

17.06

1.48

13-18

Group B
(21-25)
(n=16)

14.81

3.04

8-18

15.56

2.03

11-18

Group C
(26-30)
(n=15)

15.87

1.96

12-18

16.20

1.37

9-18

Group D
(31-45)
(n=42)

16.24

1.69

13-18

16.79

1.65

11-18

Excluded
Sample

table continues
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Easy and Hard Subscores
Subject
group

Easy
(5" and 15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Hard
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
Group A
(18-20)
(n=30)

31.73

2.29

26-35

31.97

3.38

22-36

Group B
(21-25)
(n=30)

31.93

2.10

27-35

32.47

3.40

25-36

Group C
(26-30)
(n=3 0)

32.27

2.50

27-36

32.63

3.36

22-36

Group D
(31-45)
(n=30)

32.77

2.18

26-36

32.87

3.73

23-36

Group A
(18-20)
(n=16)

31.19

3.78

25-36

32.44

3.10

26-36

Group B
(21-25)
(n=16)

31.25

3.26

26-36

30.38

4.43

23-36

Group C
(26-30)
(n=15)

31.20

2.62

27-35

32.07

3.90

21-36

Group D
(31-45)
(n=42)

32.90

2.71

27-36

33.02

3.06

26-36

Excluded
Sample

table continues
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Total Score
Subject
group

Total Score
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Sample
Group A

63.70

5.23

49-71

Group B
(21-25)
(n=30)

64.40

4.77

55-71

Group C
(26-30)
(n=3 0)

64.90

4.17

55-71

Group D
(31-45)
(n=3 0)

65.63

5.15

51-72

Group A
(18-20)
(n=16)

63.62

5.64

55-72

Group B
(21-25)
(n=16)

61.63

7.37

51-72

Group C
(26-30)
(n=15)

63.27

5.64

49-70

Group D
(31-45)
(n=42)

65.93

5.01

53-72

(18-20)

(n=30)

Excluded
Sample
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Gender:
Normative and Excluded Samples
Trial Blocks 1 through 4

Subject
Group

Trial Block 1
(5" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 2
(15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Group
Males
16.90
(n=60)

1.24

13-18

15.50

1.72

11-18

Females
(n=60)

16.43

1.16

13-18

15.52

1.59

11-18

Males
(n=54)

16.57

1.40

13-18

15.43

2.06

11-18

Females
(n=35)

16.37

1.37

13-18

15.66

2.47

8-18

Excluded
Group

Trial Block 3
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 4
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Group
Males
(n=60)

16.15

2.03

11-18

16.57

1.77

11-18

Females
(n=60)

15.78

2.27

10-18

16.47

1.72

12-18

Males
(n=54)

15.57

2.36

8-18

16.41

1.90

9-18

Females
(n=35)

16.06

1.78

12-18

16.69

1.84

11-18

Excluded
Group

table continues
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Gender:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Easy, Hard and Total Scores
Subject
group

Easy
(5" and 15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Hard
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Group
Males
32.40
(n=60)

2.32

27-36

32.72

3.28

22-36

Females
(n=60)

31.95

2.24

26-36

32.25

3.61

23-36

Males
(n=54)

32.00

2.91

26-36

31.98

3.79

21-36

Females
(n=35)

32.03

3.36

25-36

32.74

3.17

26-36

Excluded
Group

Subject
group

Total Score
Mean
SD
Range

Normative
Group
Males
(n=60)

65.12

4.61

49-72

Females
(n=60)

64.20

5.06

51-72

Males
(n=54)

63.98

5.90

49-72

Females
(n=35)

64.77

5.85

53-72

Excluded
Group
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group:
Normative and Excluded Samples

Total Scores
Subject
group

Normative Sample
Total Score
Mean
SD
Range

Excluded Sample
Total Score
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=10)

64.73

5.32

49-71

63.90

5.38

56-72

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=6)

62.67

5.11

53-69

63.17

6.55

55-70

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=14)

64.40

4.66

55-71

61.00

7.45

51-72

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=2)

64.40

5.05

55-71

66.00

7.07

61-71

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=9)

64.13

4.84

55-70

63.44

6.91

49-70

Group C
(26-30)/
Females
(n=6)

65.67

3.37

62-71

63.00

3.52

59-69

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=21)

67.20

3.10

62-72

66.24

3.49

61-71

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

64.07

6.33

51-72

65.62

6.26

53-72

table continues

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group: Normative Sample

Trial Blocks 1 and 2
Subject
Group

Trial Block 1
(5" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 2
(15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=15)

16.93

1.03

15-18

15.13

1.81

11-18

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=15)

16.20

1.26

13-18

15.20

1.52

13-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=15)

16.60

1.40

14-18

15.33

1.91

12-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=15)

16.47

1.19

14-18

15.47

1.25

14-17

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=15)

16.60

1.55

13-18

15.73

1.94

11-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Females
(n=15)

16.47

1.19

14-18

15.47

1.25

14-17

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=15)

17.47

.74

16-18

15.80

1.21

14-18

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

16.73

1.10

15-18

15.53

1.96

11-18

table continues
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group:
Normative Sample

Trial Blocks 3 and 4
Subject
group

Trial Block 3
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 4
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=15)

16.00

2.10

11-18

16.67

1.80

11-18

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=15)

15.47

2.36

10-18

15.80

1.52

13-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=15)

16.13

2.00

12-18

16.33

1.59

13-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=15)

15.87

2.07

11-18

16.60

1.88

12-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=15)

15.80

2.40

11-18

16.00

2.42

11-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Females
(n=15)

16.53

1.30

15-18

16.93

1.16

15-18

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=15)

16.67

1.68

13-18

17.27

.80

16-18

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

15.27

3.03

10-18

16.53

2.13

12-18

table continues

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group;
Normative Sample
Easy and Hard Scores
Subject
Group

Easy
(5" and 15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Hard
(3 0" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=15)

32.07

2.31

27-35

32.67

3.39

22-36

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=15)

31.40

2.29

26-35

31.27

3.33

24-36

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=15)

31.93

2.46

27-35

32.47

3.14

26-36

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=15)

31.93

1.75

30-35

32.47

3.76

25-36

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=15)

32.33

2.72

27-36

31.80

4.23

22-36

Group C
(26-30)/
Females
(n=15)

32.20

2.37

29-35

33.47

2.00

30-36

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=15)

33.27

1.62

30-36

33.93

1.91

30-36

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

32.27

2.58

26-36

31.80

4.77

23-36

table continues
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Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group:
Excluded Sample
Trial Blocks 1 and 2
Subject
Group

Trial Block 1
(5" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 2
(15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=10)

16.30

1.49

14-18

15.00

2.26

12-18

Group A
(18-20)/
Females

16.33

1.86

13-18

14.67

3.98

8-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=14)

16.07

1.54

13-18

14.86

2.41

11-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=2)

17.00

1.41

16-18

16.50

.71

16-17

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=9)

16.78

1.20

15-18

15.33

2.12

12-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Females
(n=6)

15.67

.52

15-16

14.17

2.23

11-17

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=21)

16.95

1.28

13-18

16.05

1.63

13-18

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

16.52

1.40

13-18

16.29

1.93

12-18

( n =6)

table continues
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Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group:
Excluded Sample
Trial Blocks 3 and 4
Subject
Group

Trial Block 3
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Trial Block 4
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=10)

15.80

2.30

12-18

16.80

1.81

13-18

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=6)

14.67

1.97

12-17

17.50

.55

17-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=14)

14.57

3.13

8-18

15.50

2.03

11-18

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=2)

16.50

2.12

15-18

16.00

2.83

14-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=9)

15.33

2.12

12-18

16.00

2.92

9-18

Group C
(26-30)/
Females

16.67

1.51

14-18

16.50

1.38

15-18

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=21)

16.24

1.73

13-18

17.00

.95

15-18

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n=15)

16.24

1.70

13-18

16.57

2.13

11-18

( n =6)

table continues

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores
by Sex and by Age Group:
Excluded Sample
Easy and Hard Scores
Subject
Group

Easy
(5" and 15" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Hard
(30" items)
Mean
SD
Range

Group A
(18-20)/
Males
(n=10)

31.30

3.20

27-36

32.60

3.69

26-36

Group A
(18-20)/
Females
(n=6)

31.00

4.94

25-36

32.17

2.04

30-34

Group B
(21-25)/
Males
(n=14)

30.93

3.32

26-36

30.07

4.46

23-36

Group B
(21-25)/
Females
(n=2)

33.50

2.12

32-35

32.50

4.95

29-36

Group C
(26-30)/
Males
(n=9)

32.11

2.67

28-35

31.33

4.64

21-36

Group C
(26-30)/
Females

29.83

2.04

27-33

33.17

2.40

30-36

Group D
(31-45)/
Males
(n=21)

33.00

2.41

27-36

33.24

2.43

28-36

Group D
(31-45)
Females
(n~15)

32.81

3.04

27-36

32.81

3.63

26-36

( n =6)
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Table 7

Test for Homogeneity of the Regressions:
Summary of F-ratios for the Normative Sample

PDRT Score

F-ratio

Total

1.11

Easy Items

1.07

Hard Items

1.01

Trial Block 1

.90

Trial Block 2

1.39

Trial Block 3

.88

Trial Block 4

1.19

Notes:
df=49
<.01

aE

.05 c£><. 10

bp<
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Table 8

Summary of F-ratios for Covariate Analyses of Variance;
Normative Sample
PDRT Total scores. Easy and Hard subscores
PDRT
Total Score
Main effects
Sex
Group

1.83
.73

Subscores
Easy Score
Hard Score
3.88°
.97

.37
.31

2-way interactions
Sex by Group
1.43

.41

1.60

Covariates
Early History
3.30°
Education
1.58
Mild Head Injury .04
Toxic Risk
.19
Anoxic Risk
.00
Illness
.02
Family History
.02

3.83°
4.69b
.63
1.28
.03
.28
.00

1.59
.12
.05
.01
.04
.30
.02

Notes;
df=l for sex main effects and each of covariates
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects
aE<.01

bE<.05 cE<.10
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Table 9

Summary of F-ratios for Covariate Analyses of Variance:
Normative Sample
Trial Blocks 1 through 4
PDRT Subscores
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
(5" delay) (15" delay) (30" delay) (30" delay)
Main effects
Sex
Group

9.35"
1.36

.29
.83

.31
.25

.00
.69

2-way interactions
Sex x Group
.58

.11

.96

.14

Covariates
Early History 3.90c
Education
8.59a
Mild Head Inj. 1.07
Toxic Risk
.01
Anoxic Risk
.87
Illness
.03
Family History .12

1.57
.78
.12
2.46
.14
.68
.12

.89
.09
.43
.04
.51
.001
.05

Notes:
df=l for sex main effects and each of covariates
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects
<.01 b£><. 05 °£<.10

aE

1.81
1.26
1.68
.00
.24
.28
.02
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Table 10

Summary of F-Ratios from MAN0VA/s Assessing
Effect of Length of Delay Interval on PDRT Scores:
Normative Sample

Effect

F-Ratio

Within-Subjects Effect
of Delay (Trial Blocks 1-3)

18.82s

Comparisons of Means
Trial Block 1 (X=16.67)

>

Trial Block 2 (X= 15.51)

49.90"

Trial Block 2 (X=15.51)

<

Trial Block 3 (X= 15.97)

5.60b

Trial Block 3 (X=15.97)

<

Trial Block 4 (X= 16.52)

10.44a

Easy (X=32.18) <
Notes:
df=1
aE<.01

bp<.0 5 c£<. 10

Hard (X=32.48)

1.07
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Table 11

Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Total Scores for Motivation
and Compensation Item Endorsements: Normative Sample
Motivation Item Question:
Do you feel that you performed to the best of your ability
on this test?
Endorsement

Mean

SD

n

1 ("strongly disagree")

64.66

3.20

6

2

70.00

.00

1

3

57.00

6.97

4

4

63.44

5.40

29

5 ("strongly agree")

65.41

4.24

80

Whole Group Mean

64.65

4.60

120

Compensation Item Question:
Do you feel that you might have performed better if you
received financial compensation to do so?
Endorsement

Mean

SD

n

1 ("strongly disagree")

65.14

4.79

67

2

64.46

3.83

15

3

64.71

5.23

14

4

63.91

6.15

12

5 ("strongly agree")

62.83

4.52

12

Whole Group Mean

64.65

4.86

120

Table 12

Test for Homogeneity of the Regressions:
Summary of F-ratios for the Excluded Sample

PDRT Score
Total

F-ratio
.05

Easy Items

2.06b

Hard Items

1.25

Trial Block 1

1.18

Trial Block 2

2.94"

Trial Block 3

.87

Trial Block 4

2.20b

Notes:
df=39
aj)<. 01

^<.05 ^<.10
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Table 13
Summary of F-ratios for Analyses of Variance:
Excluded Sample

Trial Blocks 1 throucrh 4
Block 1
(5" delay)
Main effects
Sex
Group

PDRT Subscores
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4
(15" delay) (30" delay) (30" delay)

1.21
1.10

.00
2.27

.17
1.65

.00
2.15

2-way interactions
Sex by Group
.96

.53

1.25

.49

Total scores. Easy and Hard subscores
PDRT
Total Score

PDRT Subscores
Easy Items
Hard Items
(5" and 15" delay) (3 0" delay)

Main effects
Sex
.00
Group
2.34

.26
2.40c

.09
1.90

2-way interactions
Sex x Group .49

1.04

.64

Notes:
df=l for sex main effects
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects
lg<. 01

b]0<.0 5 c£<.10
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Table 14

Summary of F-Ratios for MANOVA's Assessing the Effect of
Length of Delay Interval on PDRT Scores: Excluded Sample

Effect

F-Ratio

Within-Subjects Effect
of Delay (Trial Blocks 1 - 3 )

10.18s

Comparisons of Means
Trial Block 1 (X=16.49)

>

Trial Block 2 (X=15.52)

20.23s

Trial Block 2 (X=15.52)

<

Trial Block 3 (X=15.76)

1.12

Trial Block 3 (X=15.76)

<

Trial Block 4 (X=16.52)

14.02s

Easy (X=32.01) <

Notes:
df=l
aE<.01

b£<.05 c£<.10

Hard (X=32.28)

.64
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Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Total Scores for Motivation
and Compensation Item Endorsements: Excluded Sample
Motivation Item Question:
Do you feel that you performed to the best of your ability
on this test?
Endorsement

Mean

SD

n

1 ("strongly disagree")

63.66

3.21

3

2

61.00

8.88

3

3

59.75

4.99

4

4

61.78

6.22

23

5 ("strongly agree")

65.85

5.24

56

Whole Group Mean

64.29

5.58

89

Compensation Item Question:
Do you feel that you might have performed better if you
received financial compensation to do so?
Endorsement

Mean

SD

1 ("strongly disagree")

65.93

4.98

46

2

62.63

6.22

19

3

63.55

5.17

9

4

56.16

3.81

6

5 ("strongly agree")

66.12

6.57

8

Whole Group Mean

64.32

5.38

88*

Notes:
*data was missing for one subject

n

88
Figure 1

Length of Delay:
Effect o n PDRT S c o r e s
Mean Score
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Normative Sample: Easy vs. Hard Items
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Figure 2

Length of Delay:
E f f e c t o n PDRT S c o r e s
Mean Score
20
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5

0

Block 1-5"

Block 2-15" Block 3-30" Block 4-30"

Length of Delay Interval
'

Series A

Normative Sample: Blocks 1 - 4
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Figure 3

Length of Delay:
E f f e c t o n PDRT S c o r e s
Mean Score
40

»
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Easy Items (5"k 15")

Hard Items (30")

Length of Delay Interval
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Excluded Sample: Easy vs. Hard Items
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Figure 4

Length of Delay:
E f f e c t o n PDRT S c o r e s
Mean Score
20

15

10

5

0

Block 1-5"

Block 2-15" Block 3-30" Block 4-30"

Length of Delay Interval
'

Series A

Excluded Sample: Blocks 1 - 4
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Figure 5

PDRT Scores for Subject Groups:
Norm, Excluded, Binder & Willis (1991)
PDRT Score (raw # correct)

i ce

Easy

Hard

Total

PDRT Score (Name)
Series
NERM
SAMPTO A

Series B
IT«LU4*4 U&P'II(«MTT*AT)
Series E
_J Series F
MM D)»ER4*R-H« CEMP (ANTE*) MIL* 8M4 TFWUIM-OIAP
(«UIT*BI)

Ait

Series A=Normative;B=Excluded;C=Nonpt-No
Comp,D=BD —NoComp;E = AD-NoComp;F=MHT—Comp;
G=BD—Comp;H=Nonpt —Comp(Simulators)

_J Series C
Series D
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Notes:
"Comp"=subjects in line for compensatn
"No Com.p"=Ss not in Iin« for comptnaat'n

APPENDIX A
Preliminary Screening
Neurological History
Yes

No

Yes

No

1. Have you ever been evaluated by a
neurologist or neurosurgeon?
2.* Have you ever had any of the
following tests?
Skull X-ray
EEG/BEAM
CAT Scan
MRI Scan
PET
Art er iography
Spinal Tap
Pneumoencephalogram
Neuropsychological Testing
3.* Have you ever had brain surgery?
4.* Have you ever been diagnosed with
any of the following?
Brain Tumor
Encephalitis
Meningitis
Multiple Sclerosis
Parkinson's Disease
Polio
Neurosyphilis
Stroke
Huntington's Chorea
Epilepsy
5.* Have you ever had any seizures?
Psychiatric History
1. Have you ever had a mental health
evaluation?
2 . " Have you ever been hospitalized for
mental health treatment?

Diagnosis?
3.* Have you ever received electric shock
treatments?

Drug History
1. Have you ever taken or been prescribed
any of the following?
Yes
'Antidepressants
Tofranil
Elavil
Vivactil
Sinequan
Aventyl
Pertofrane
Norpramin
Prozac
Desyrel
Ascendin
'Anticonvulsants
Dilantin
Phenobarbital
Tegretol
Celontin
Clonopin
Mepoline
Mysoline
Zarontin
Others
'Major tranquilizers
Thorazine
Stelazine
Prolixin
Mellaril
Haldol
Navane
Moban
Lithium
Hallucinogens
Marijuana
'How often? (>2x/week)
LSD, Mescaline, Peyote, STP,
DMT, Psilocybin
'How often? (>50x)
'in the past month?
'Heroin, Opium, Hashish
'Cocaine, Crack, Ecstasy

Yes

No

No

Inhalents
*How often? (10x)_
*In the past week?
Hypnotics
*How often (>50x/year)
*In the past week?
Stimulants
Dexedrine
Dexamyl
Biphetamine
Benzedrine
Desoxyn
Preludin
Ritalin
*How long? (>20 years)
*In the past week?
Minor Tranquilizers
Chlordiazepoxide (Librium)
Diazepam (Valium)
Oxazepam (Serax)
Clorazepate (Tanxene)
Meprobamate (Equanil, Miltown)
Hydroxyzine (Atarax, Vistaril)
Xanax (Alprazolam)
Lorazapam (Ativan)
Buspirone (Buspar)
*In the past week?
Sleeping Pills
Seconal ("Reds")
Nembutal
Tuinal
Phenobarbital
Butabarbital
Amytal
Quaalude
Doriden
Dalmane
Chloral Hydrate
Noludar
Placidyl
Halcion
*In the past week?

Yes
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Pain Drugs

Yes

Talwin
Morphine
Codeine
Percodan
Numorphan
Darvon, Darvocet, Darvon "N"
Methadon
Demerol
Dilaudid
Fiorinal
*In the past week?
'Have you ever been treated for alcoholism?

No

Yes

No

Are you taking any medications at this time?
How much caffeine have you had
today?
When was your last dose of
caffeine?
At what age did you have your first, full alcoholic
beverage?
Exclusion Criteria*
Subjects were excluded from this study if any of the
following
criteria were met.
1) They had been diagnosed with a neurological disease or
they had undergone special neurodiagnostic tests indicating
clinical suspicion of a neurological problem.
2)

They had experienced major brain trauma.

3)

They had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder.

4) They smoked or had smoked marijuana more than 2 times
per week.
5) They had used hallucinogens more than 50 times per year
and/or in the previous week.
6)

They had ever used cocaine, crack, ecstasy, or heroin.

7) They had used stimulants more than 20 times per year
and/or in the previous week.
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8)

They had used minor tranquilizers in the previous week.

9) They had used major tranquilizers, antidepressants, or
anticonvulsants on a regular basis for at least one year
preceding the study.
10) They had used inhalants more than 10 times and/or in the
previous week.
11) They had suffered more than 3 minor head injuries with
at least one resulting in a concussion or loss of
consciousness.
12) They had ever lost consciousness for more than 5
minutes.
*Grant et al, 1978 and Grant, Adams, & Reed, 1974
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APPENDIX B
Medical Risk Screening
Early History
Yes
1. Were you born prematurely by one
month or more?
2.

Were there any birth problems?

3. Did you weigh 5 pounds or more at
birth?
4. Were there any difficulties with your
mothers pregnancy before your birth?
_
5. Did you have a major illness before
age 6?
What illness?
6. Did you ever have febrile
convulsions?
Education
1.

Were you ever held back in school?

2. Did you have any learning problems
with reading, writing, spelling,
or math?

3. Did you ever receive special
education or special tutoring?
4. Were you ever referred to the school
psychologist?
5. What was your high school grade point
average?

No

?

9Minor Head Injury
1. Have you ever sustained a
head injury?
How many?
(>3)
2. Have you ever lost consciousness
due to a head injury?
How long?

(>5')

Toxic Risk
1. Have you ever lost consciousness due
to alcohol or drug ingestion?
2. Have you ever had a blackout due to
alcohol or drug ingestion?
3. Have you experienced a withdrawal
due to alcohol or drug ingestion?
Anoxic Risk
1. Have you ever had generalized
anesthesia?
2. Have you ever needed cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation?
3. Have you ever had poisoning from the
following?
Carbon Monoxide
Metallic poisoning
Bromide/Pesticide
Illness Risk
1. Have you ever had or do you have
any of the following?
Hypertens ion
Arthritis
Anemia
Diabetes
Liver Disease
Arteriosclerosis
Coronary Heart Disease
Pulmonary Disease
Emphysema
Systemic Lupus Erthematosus
(autoimmune disease)

2. Have you ever had artificial
respiration?
3. Have you ever had fevers of
104 degrees or more?
Family History
1. Has or does anyone in your immediate
family suffer from alcoholism?
2. Has anyone in your immediate family
ever had a neurological problem?
Relationship?
Problem?
3. Has anyone in your immediate family
ever had a psychiatric problem?
Relationship?
Problem?
4. Has anyone in your immediate family
ever had a learning disability?
Relationship?
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APPENDIX C
PDRT Instructions to the Patient
Laurence M. Binder c. 1989, 1990
"I want you to remember a number that I will read to you.
After I read it to you, I want you to count backward from 20
to 1, like this: 20, 19, 18, and so on. Then, I'll show you
a card with two numbers on it. One of them is the number I
asked you to remember. Read the number you remember from
the card. The first number to remember is (first item).
Now count backwards from 20."
Interrupt S by presenting response card after 5 seconds for
each item. If necessary, interrupt S by asking, "Which one
was it?" Give feedback, "right" or "wrong" for every
response.
After 18 items with 5-sec delay, say "You're doing just
fine." Don't praise if S is correct on less than 12 of 18).
Then say, "Now it's going to get harder. Now, after I read
the number I want you to count backwards from 50. Before, I
was only giving you 5 seconds to count, but now I will give
you 15 seconds, so it will be harder. The first number to
remember is (read first number)."
After 18 items with 15-sec delay, repeat essentially the
same instructions, except that the counting is from 100, and
there is a 30 sec delay. At 30-sec delay, administer 3 6
items in order to complete the full test.
There are only 18 different items and 36 response cards.
The same items are repeated four times, and each response
card is used twice on the 72 item test.
Be sure to give feedback after each response and to praise
for good performance after 18 5-sec items and 18 15-sec
items only if S is correct on at least 12. All Ss are told
that the test is getting harder at the transitions from 5sec to 15-sec and 15-sec to 3 0 sec.

APPENDIX D
PORTLAND DIGIT RECOGNITION TEST

L
Five
Second

Fifteen
Second

-•

Thirty
Second

71394
27586
58192
38295
72819
-

94376
56392
82193
81293
47391
48526
86524
47159
74629
38295
59182
12853
28149
Total
Correct

E.ASV

(4 AR. b

total corr

/tfl
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APPENDIX E
Post-Assessment
Motivation and Compensation Items

Circle the number below each question which corresponds best
with your feeling.
Please respond as honestly as possible.

1.
Do you feel that you performed to the best of your
ability on this test?
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
strongly
agree

2.
Do you feel that you might have performed better if you
received financial compensation to do so?
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
strongly
agree

